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OVER MY DEAD BODY: A NEW APPROACH TO 
TESTAMENTARY RESTRAINTS ON MARRIAGE 
Ruth Sarah Lee? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Money is a tool that can be wielded from the grave.  The dead-
hand may attempt to distribute money to shape the affairs, and 
influence the choices of the living.  It is not uncommon to find 
deeds or wills that try to shape the behavior of the beneficiary by 
conditioning a grant, devise, or bequest on a potential 
beneficiary’s conduct.  While not every conditional gift is 
designed to influence the beneficiary’s behavior, many are 
devised for that very purpose.  Behind these gifts are different 
motives from different testators – whether it is a desire for 
control, benevolent paternalism, or even revenge.1  This article, 
specifically, turns to the problem of restraints on marriage.  
Testators (usually parents) write wills prohibiting, penalizing, or 
requiring marriage to one of a particular religious faith or 
ethnicity as an attempt to shape the beneficiary’s (usually the 
child’s) romantic decisions. 
 
       ?  Law Clerk to the Hon. Richard Suhrheinrich (Sixth Circuit) 2012-
2013; Harvard Law School, JD 2012. Many thanks to Professor Jacob 
Gersen and Professor Robert Sitkoff at Harvard Law School.  I am also 
indebted to Judge Ricardo Martinez of the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Washington State, Chris Nicoll of the law 
firm Nicoll Black & Feig PLLC, and also Nicola Menaldo, Tim 
Fitzgerald, Lura Smith, Carol Miller, Melody Byrd, and Jensen 
Mauseth. All errors remain my own. 
 1.  See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER, ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JAMES LINDGREN, WILLS, 
TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 35 n. 11 (8th ed. 2009) (noting a 1993 Associated Press story 
from Romania about how a “man who was nagged by his wife to stop smoking has 
left her everything—but only if she takes up his habit as punishment for 40 years of 
‘hell.’”). 
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In addressing these restraints on marriage, many courts 
have taken a “reasonableness” approach.2  Even cases that do 
not explicitly take a “reasonableness” approach—but argue 
purely in terms of balancing public policy goals—tend to use 
language shaded with “reasonableness” rhetoric.3  A complete 
(total or general) restraint of marriage is a restraint that prohibits 
the beneficiary to benefit from the will if he marries anyone at 
any time.4  A partial restraint of marriage is, in contrast, limited 
in time or applicable to a specific class of persons.5 
 
 2.  See infra Section II.B. 
 3.  See, e.g., In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 899 (Ill. 2009) [hereinafter 
Feinberg II]  
([W]hoever will take the trouble to examine this branch of the law 
attentively, will find that the testator may impose reasonable and prudent 
restraints upon the marriage of the objects of his bounty, by means of 
conditions precedent, or subsequent, or by limitations, while he may not, 
with one single exception, impose perpetual celibacy upon the objects of 
his bounty, by means of conditions subsequent or limitations. 
(emphasis added) (quoting Shackelford v. Hall, 19 Ill. 212, 215 (1857))).   
The Illinois Supreme Court in Feinberg II reversed the state appellate court decision.  
Id. at 903.  The appellate court ruled that a trust provision providing that a 
descendant “who marries outside the Jewish faith (unless the spouse of such 
descendant has converted or converts within one year of the marriage to the Jewish 
faith) and his or her descendants shall be deemed to be deceased,” In re Estate of 
Feinberg, 891 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) [hereinafter Feinberg I], rev’d, 919 
N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009), was invalid without discussion of whether the clause was 
reasonable or not.  Feinberg I, 891 N.E.2d at 552.  Instead, the appellate court had 
ruled simply that “the provision in the case before us is invalid because it seriously 
interferes with and limits the right of individuals to marry a person of their own 
choosing.” Id. Furthermore, the concurring opinion for the appellate decision of 
Feinberg I referred to the reasonableness test.  Id. at 555 (Quinn, J., concurring) 
(“While the Restatement (First) and (Second) of Trusts explained that restraints 
such as the instant ‘Jewish Clause’ were once considered reasonable, the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts now provides that they are no longer reasonable.”).  
The dissent in Feinberg I also refers to the reasonableness test.  Id. at 555 (Greiman, 
J., dissenting) (“It is generally held in this country that partial restraints on marriage 
are valid unless unreasonable.” (quoting Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 234 
(Mass. 1955))).  Although Feinberg I’s facts included a trust provision, the Illinois 
Supreme Court interpreted the case as examining a testamentary provision.  
Feinberg II, 919 N.E.2d at 902. 
 4.  An example of this is a will that leaves property to a beneficiary “provided 
he never marries.” 
 5.  See, e.g., Gordon, 124 N.E.2d at 234  
(It is generally held in this country that partial restraints on marriage are 
valid unless unreasonable.  Am.Law of Property, § 27.15; Scott on Trusts, § 
62.6; Restatement: Property, § 425; 122 A.L.R. 7.  Thus testamentary gifts 
conditioned on the beneficiary not marrying a specified individual have 
been upheld.  Turner v. Evans, 134 Md. 238, 241, 106 A. 617; Graydon's 
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However, the “reasonableness” approach has several 
serious shortcomings, and fundamentally focuses on the 
incorrect issue.  The test suffers from at least four major 
problems: (1) it ostensibly questions the testator’s intent while 
ingenuously claiming that it does not;6 (2) it is empirically 
unsound;7 (3) it fails to take into account whether the restraint is 
actually consequential to the beneficiary;8 and (4) it produces 
unjustifiably inconsistent results based on geography and time.9 
Given these four problems with the “reasonableness” 
approach, a discussion and recommendation of a new approach 
is warranted.  Thus, four principle alternative approaches are 
considered in this article: (1) a blanket prohibition of all marital 
restraints, most noticeably promulgated by Professor Jeffrey G. 
Sherman;10 (2) a blanket allowance of all marital restraints 
centered on the value of honoring testator intent;11 (3) a case-by-
case balancing approach used by the court in In re Estate of 
Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009)[hereinafter Feinberg II];12 and 
(4) the possibility of pursuing a new test that does not suffer 
 
Executors v. Graydon, 23 N.J.Eq. 229, 237-238; Matter of Seaman's Will, 218 
N.Y. 77, 81, 112 N.E. 576, L.R.A.1917A, 40; In re Osborne's Petition, 21 
Pa.Dist. & Co. R., 293, 295.  A similar result has been reached where the 
condition was against marrying into a named family.  Phillips v. Ferguson, 
85 Va. 509, 513, 8 S.E. 241, 1 L.R.A. 837.  In Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 129 
Md. 455, 99 A. 672, L.R.A.1917D, 464, a requirement that a niece marry 
with the consent of her parents was held to be good, and there was an 
added statement, 129 Md. at pages 462-463, 99 A. 672, that a second 
requirement of not mar[r]ying outside the Jewish faith was also good.). 
See also In re Harris' Will, 143 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1955) 
(Conditions in general restraint of marriage were regarded at common law 
as contrary to public policy, and therefore void. . . . However, conditions in 
partial restraint of marriage, which merely impose reasonable restrictions 
upon marriage, are not against public policy. Whether a condition in 
restraint of marriage is reasonable depends, not upon the form of the 
condition, but upon its purpose and effect under the circumstances of the 
particular case.). 
 6.  See infra Section III.A. 
 7.  See infra Section III.B. 
 8.  See infra Section III.C. 
 9.  See infra Section III.D. 
 10.  See infra Sections IV.A, V.B.1. 
 11.  See infra Sections IV.B, V.B.2. 
 12.  See Feinberg II, 919 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. 2009); see also infra Sections IV.C, V.B.3. 
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from the same shortcomings as the Reasonableness Test13 
This article proposes a new test—the Coercion Test—as a 
possible alternative for courts to consider in handling 
testamentary restraints on marriage.14  If we are worried that the 
deed or will forces the donee to surrender to an “unreasonable” 
marriage or a life of loneliness, we should examine the extent to 
which the donee is actually influenced by the grant. In other 
words, instead of focusing on the donor’s “reasonableness”, 
courts should focus on the donee’s need.  The donee’s need—the 
juxtaposition of his current financial position, how much he 
would stand to gain, and how much he needs the gain, with 
how much he would have received under intestacy— will show 
how much coercion or pressure the donee is actually 
experiencing from the will. 
The discussion closes with a comparison between the 
proposed Coercion Test and the other alternative methods.  The 
article concludes that the Coercion Test will maintain the 
advantages found in the other alternatives, while avoiding many 
of the disadvantages, and is therefore one of the most sensible 
approaches to marital restraints.  The Coercion Test is a sensible 
approach because it avoids all four of the major problems with 
the Reasonableness Test, provides more respect for testator’s 
intent than a blanket prohibition, is more protective of public 
policy than a blanket allowance, and provides more consistent 
results than a case-by-case balancing approach.  Most 
importantly, the Coercion Test addresses the crux of the public 
policy problem: whether an individual is being forced into, or out 
of, marriage. 
 
 13.  See infra Section IV.D. 
 14.  See infra Sections V.A – B. 
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II.  THE REASONABLENESS TEST 
A.  WHY MARITAL RESTRAINT PROVISIONS DO NOT IMPLICATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS 
In some of the cases involving the validity of a will 
provision curtailing marriage choices, it has been argued that the 
provisions are unconstitutional because enforcing them would 
violate constitutional rights.  This argument has been 
systematically rejected for partial restraints on marriage. 
In United States National Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860 (Or. 
1954),15 the testator’s will provided that when his daughter 
turned thirty-two, she would receive a trust fund if she could 
prove to the trustee that she had not converted to Catholicism, 
or married a Catholic man.16  The daughter argued that the will 
violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights embedded 
in the United States Constitution.  However, the Court 
disagreed, finding that the First Amendment “is a limitation 
upon the power of Congress.  It has no effect upon the 
transactions of individual citizens and has been so 
interpreted.”17  The Court also stated that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not regulate individual conduct, so that the 
 
 15.  The United States National Bank of Portland (Oregon) was the trustee 
under the will, and brought the lawsuit against the decedent’s married daughter.  It 
sought a declaratory judgment to ensure that the trust had been set up properly, 
and the interpretations made correctly.  United States Nat’l Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 
P.2d 860, 861 (Or. 1954).  It sought a declaratory judgment to ensure that the trust 
had been set up properly, and the interpretations made correctly.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 862.  The relevant part of the will stated: 
When my said daughter shall have attained the age of thirty-two years and 
upon my death, that is to say, when these two events occur, my trustee is 
authorized and directed to transfer, assign and/or pay over to my said 
daughter Merle the whole of the trust fund of Fifteen Thousand 
($15,000.00) Dollars, or the one-half (1/2) of the entire estate if sum is more 
than Thirty Thousand ($30,000.00) Dollars, provided she shall have proved 
conclusively to my trustee and to its entire satisfaction that she has not 
embraced, nor become a member of, the Catholic faith nor ever married to 
a man of such faith. 
Id.   The will provided that if Merle became “ineligible to receive the trust,” the 
money would go to other family members.  Id. 
 17.  Id. at 866.  
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amendments “in no way bear on a transaction of the character 
now before us.”18  Furthermore, the Court distinguished the 
present case from Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),19 
interpreting Shelley narrowly to be: 
authority only for the proposition that the enforcement 
by state courts of a covenant in a deed restricting the 
use and occupancy of real property to persons of the 
Caucasian race falls within the purview of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a violation of the equal 
protection clause, but, said the court, “That 
Amendment [Fourteenth] erects no shield against 
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or 
wrongful.”20 
Courts have decided similarly for wills revoking gifts of 
beneficiaries who should “marry a person not born in the 
Hebrew faith”21 or for offering a bequest only if a beneficiary 
marries “a Jewish girl whose both parents were Jewish”22 within 
seven years of the testator’s death.23 
These decisions are correct.  In Shelley, the Court issued an 
order to enforce the racial covenant and affirmatively compelled 
the Shelley family to vacate their home.24  In these restraints on 
marriage cases, the courts are not ordering the beneficiaries to 
never marry.25  Furthermore, to argue that the facilitation of 
 
 18.  Id. (“Neither does the Fourteenth Amendment relate to individual 
conduct.”) 
 19.  In Shelley, the Supreme Court ruled that it would be unconstitutional for a 
state court to enforce restrictive covenants against occupancy or ownership of 
property by African Americans.  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 23 (1948). 
 20.  Snodgrass, 275 P.2d at 866 (citing Shelley, 334 U.S. at 23). 
 21.  Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Mass. 1955). 
 22.  Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 826 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974). 
 23.  Id. at 827—28 (holding that while  
[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very 
existence and survival . . . [that] [i]n the case at bar, this court is not being 
asked to enforce any restriction upon Daniel Jacob Shapira's constitutional 
right to marry.  Rather, this court is being asked to enforce the testator's 
restriction upon his son's inheritance.  If the facts and circumstances of this 
case were such that the aid of this court were sought to enjoin Daniel's 
marrying a non-Jewish girl, then the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer would 
be applicable, but not, it is believed, upon the facts as they are.). 
 24.  Shelley, 334 U.S. at 4, 6. 
 25.  See, e.g., Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 827 (“In the case at bar, this court is not 
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probate is subject to all Fourteenth Amendment restrictions 
would automatically invalidate any testamentary donation to 
religious organizations by private individuals.  This would be an 
absurd result.  Constitutionality is a poor way to challenge 
restraints on marriage because they are almost certainly 
constitutional.  Most courts have turned, instead, to a test of 
“reasonableness”. 
B.  WHAT IT MEANS FOR A MARITAL RESTRAINT TO BE 
REASONABLE 
Complete restraints of marriage—restraints that prohibit the 
beneficiary from marrying any person ever—are considered per 
se “unreasonable”, and thus void.26  However, partial restraints 
may be valid and “not contrary to public policy”27 if they impose 
“only reasonable restrictions.”28  Not every court applies the 
Reasonableness Test,29 but many do.30 
 
being asked to enforce any restriction upon Daniel Jacob Shapira’s constitutional 
right to marry. Rather, this court is being asked to enforce the testator’s restriction 
upon his son’s inheritance.”). 
 26.  Id. at 829 (“If the condition were that the beneficiary not marry anyone, the 
restraint would be general or total, and, at least in the case of a first marriage, 
would be held to be contrary to public policy and void.”). 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  DUKEMINIER, ET AL., supra note 1, at 34. 
 30.  See, e.g., Gordon v. Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228, 234 (Mass. 1955)  
(It is generally held in this country that partial restraints on marriage are 
valid unless unreasonable.  Am.Law of Property, § 27.15; Scott on Trusts, § 
62.6; Restatement: Property, § 425; 122 A.L.R. 7.  Thus testamentary gifts 
conditioned on the beneficiary not marrying a specified individual have 
been upheld.  Turner v. Evans, 134 Md. 238, 241, 106 A. 617; Graydon's 
Executors v. Graydon, 23 N.J.Eq. 229, 237-238; Matter of Seaman's Will, 218 
N.Y. 77, 81, 112 N.E. 576, L.R.A.1917A, 40; In re Osborne's Petition, 21 
Pa.Dist. & Co. R., 293, 295.  A similar result has been reached where the 
condition was against marrying into a named family.  Phillips v. Ferguson, 
85 Va. 509, 513, 8 S.E. 241, 1 L.R.A. 837.); 
see also In re Harris' Will, 143 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1955)  
(Conditions in general restraint of marriage were regarded at common law 
as contrary to public policy, and therefore void. . . . However, conditions in 
partial restraint of marriage, which merely impose reasonable restrictions 
upon marriage, are not against public policy. Whether a condition in 
restraint of marriage is reasonable depends, not upon the form of the 
condition, but upon its purpose and effect under the circumstances of the 
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An example of a partial restraint can be found in Gordon v. 
Gordon, 124 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1955), where the decedent’s will 
provided: 
If any of my said children shall marry a person not 
born in the Hebrew faith then I hereby revoke the gift 
or gifts and the provision or provisions herein made to 
or for such child, and I direct that the portion or 
portions of my estate, and the interest or interests 
therein which I have by this will given to such child so 
marrying a person not born in the Hebrew faith shall be 
paid and made over to that person or persons who 
would have been entitled thereto under this will if such 
beneficiary had died before becoming entitled by the 
provisions hereof to such portion or portions, interest 
or interests, without leaving lawful issue.31 
In Gordon, the beneficiary in question married a woman 
whose parents were Roman Catholic, but after the testator’s 
death, she “undertook religious instruction under rabbis . . . 
became a convert to Judaism and received a certificate 
recognizing her conversion [and] went through a rabbinical 
ceremony of marriage.”32  However, the Court affirmed the trial 
judge’s finding that at the time of marriage, the wife “was not in 
any sense Jewish or Hebrew and it could not then be said that 
she was born in the Hebrew faith.”33 
Furthermore, the Court found that the restraint was 
reasonable, noting that the 
 
particular case.);  
Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 827; 6 WILLIAM J. BOWE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE 
LAW OF WILLS § 44.25 (Rev. Ed. 2005); 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 118 (2011); United 
States Nat’l Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 866 (Or. 1954); In re Silverstein’s Will, 
155 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1956); Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 99 A. 672, 675 
(Md. 1916); Jeremy Macklin, The Puzzling Case of Max Feinberg: An Analysis of 
Conditions in Partial Restraint of Marriage, 43 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 265, 271 (2009) (“A 
partial restraint is subject to a reasonableness test; the restraint will be ‘valid or 
invalid according to whether it is reasonable or unreasonable.’” (quoting E. 
LeFevre, Annotation, Validity of Provisions of Will or Deed Prohibiting, Penalizing, or 
Requiring Marriage to One of a Particular Religious Faith, 50 A.L.R. 2D 740, § 2 at 740 
(1956))). 
 31.  Gordon, 124 N.E.2d at 230. 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id. (The court also insisted that “born in the Jewish faith” referred to the 
ordinary sense of the word “born”, not the spiritual sense.) 
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only American case which might be said to hold a 
testamentary condition against marrying outside a 
certain religion to be unreasonable could rest on the 
ground that in the circumstances the restriction of the 
beneficiary’s choice of spouse to the Society of Friends 
would operate as a complete prohibition of marriage.34 
The Court did not expand much further on the 
“reasonableness” analysis beyond this distinction.35  Similarly, 
other cases use the Reasonableness Test with little to no 
explanation as to why it is preferred.36 
Restatement (Second) of Property reflects this in that, “[t]he 
restraint unreasonably limits the transferee’s opportunity to 
marry if a marriage permitted by the restraint is not likely to 
occur.  The likelihood of marriage is a factual question, to be 
answered from the circumstances of the particular case.”37 
The test of “reasonableness” becomes, then, a temporal and 
geographical test of how many viable marriage candidates are 
accessible to the beneficiary.38  For example, the Gordon Court 
 
 34.  Id. at 234. 
 35.  Id.  
(The contention is made that a restriction conditioned upon the religious 
faith of the parents of the prospective wife at the time of her birth is 
unreasonable.  The question is not whether the testator used good 
judgment in including paragraph 14 in his will or whether we should 
approve or disapprove his action.  What we have to decide is whether he 
was prevented from doing as he did by any rule of law.  We are unable to 
discover that he was.) 
 36.  See, e.g., In re Rosenthal’s Estate, 123 N.Y.S.2d 326, 333 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1953) 
(noting that “conditions in partial restraint of marriage, which merely impose 
reasonable restrictions upon marriage, are not against public policy.” (quoting 
Matter of Liberman, 18 N.E.2d 658, 660 (1939))); In re Harris’ Will, 143 N.Y.S.2d 746, 
748 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1955) (holding valid a provision for the distribution of the corpus 
of a trust after the death of the life beneficiary, which stipulated that any beneficiary 
“at the time of my death be married to any person born or begotten of parents other 
than of the Hebrew religion and faith”, id., will not receive the bequest.); In re Weil’s 
Estate, 124 Misc. 692, 695 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1925)  aff'd sub nom. In the Matter of Weil, 
213 N.Y.S. 933 (1926) (“On the other hand, however, a clause in special restraint of 
marriage, such as prohibition of marriage to a person outside of a particular faith, 
or to a designated person, is in the ordinary course valid.”). 
 37.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. a (1983). 
 38.  Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory of 
Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 
1319—20 (1999)  
(When considering partial restraints on marriage, courts often, though not 
consistently, direct their attention not to the arbitrariness of a restraint's 
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noted: 
Joseph Gordon was an orthodox Jew, and his children 
were brought up in the tenets of that faith.  About 50 
Jewish families lived in the city of Attleboro and the 
town of North Attleboro.  There was an orthodox 
synagogue in Attleboro.  Harold was not limited in the 
choice of a wife to a resident of that city.39 
The court in Shapira v. Union National Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974) conducted a similar analysis: 
[C]ounsel for the plaintiff asserts that the number of 
eligible Jewish females in this county would be an 
extremely small minority of the total population 
especially as compared with the comparatively much 
greater number in New York, whence have come many 
of the cases comprising the weight of authority 
upholding the validity of such clauses.  There are no 
census figures in evidence.  While this court could 
probably take judicial notice of the fact that the Jewish 
community is a minor, though important segment of 
our total local population, nevertheless the court is by 
no means justified in judicial knowledge that there is an 
insufficient number of eligible young ladies of Jewish 
parentage in this area from which Daniel would have a 
reasonable latitude of choice.  And of course, Daniel is 
not at all confined in his choice to residents of this 
county, which is a very different circumstance in this 
day of travel by plane and freeway and communication 
by telephone, from the horse and buggy days.40 
Thus, judges who apply the Reasonableness Test have to 
operate as generalists in the extremity.  They must determine not 
only issues of law, but also the number and availability of 
compatible companions for the beneficiary. 
 
content but to the extent of its reach. If a will conditions a bequest on the 
legatee's marrying a certain kind of person, and if the number of 
‘qualifying’ potential spouses in the legatee's geographic area is so small 
that it would be difficult if not impossible for the legatee to secure such a 
spouse, the condition will be held void because, in operation, it amounts to 
a virtual prohibition of marriage. But if the number of qualifying  potential 
spouses is high enough, the condition will be upheld as a reasonable 
partial restraint.). 
 39.  Gordon, 124 N.E.2d at 230. 
 40.  Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 831 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974). 
TABLES.FORMATTED.LEE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2013  11:35 AM 
2012] RESTRAINTS ON MARRIAGE 65 
III.  FOUR MAJOR PROBLEMS WITH THE REASONABLENESS TEST 
A.  QUESTIONING THE TESTATOR’S JUDGMENT 
It is insincere to claim, on the one hand, that it is not within 
the purview of the court to question whether the testator used 
good judgment in structuring the provisions of his will,41 but on 
the other hand, judging the “reasonableness” of that provision.  
In fact, courts are very careful to highlight this distinction by 
explicitly stating, in the opinion, that the question is not whether 
the testator used good judgment.42 
In reality, the courts are making judgments about the 
testator’s judgment.  When a testator’s explicit restraint is 
pronounced “unreasonable”—so “unreasonable” that the court 
refuses to enforce it—that pronouncement is in of itself a 
statement about the testator’s judgment.  The effect of the 
Reasonableness Test is that testators—regardless of what their 
actual intention is—cannot condition gifts on marital conditions 
that are not likely to exist. 
Suppose a testator writes a will that states, “I give 
everything to Daughter if she is accepted to Harvard University; 
otherwise, I give everything to charity.”  Even if the condition is 
very unlikely to be fulfilled—that is, Daughter has bad grades 
and test scores—it is unlikely that this provision would be struck 
down for public policy reasons.  The testator is free to distribute 
his money based on whatever conditions he desires, regardless 
of the probability that the condition will be fulfilled. 
 
 41.  See, e.g., id. at 832. (“His unmistakable testamentary plan was that his 
possessions be used to encourage the preservation of the Jewish faith and blood, 
hopefully through his sons, but, if not, then through the State of Israel. Whether this 
judgment was wise is not for this court to determine.”). 
 42.  Gordon, 124 N.E.2d at 234 (“The question is not whether the testator used 
good judgment in including paragraph 14 in his will or whether we should approve 
or disapprove his action.”); Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 832 (“His unmistakable 
testamentary plan was that his possessions be used to encourage the preservation of 
the Jewish faith and blood, hopefully through his sons, but, if not, then through the 
State of Israel. Whether this judgment was wise is not for this court to determine.”).  
This language notwithstanding, the courts in both Gordon and Shapira proceeded to 
analyze the reasonableness of the wills’ provisions, as discussed supra Section II.B.  
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Given the general emphasis on respecting the testator’s 
intent,43 why are marital restraints the exception?  If a testator 
wishes to condition a gift on an event that has a low probability 
of occurring, as in the Harvard example, the gift, on its face, 
does not contravene public policy.  Thus, there is very little 
support for why—in the cases of marital restraints—the courts 
and the Restatement determine that gifts conditioned on an 
unlikely event always violate public policy.44 
B.  EMPIRICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE FACTUAL QUESTION OF 
REASONABLENESS 
The Reasonableness Test is questionable not only as an 
issue of law, but it is also problematic as applied.  As applied, 
“reasonableness” is a factual test.45  This puts judges in the 
position of estimating the probability that a marriage permitted 
by the restraint will occur.  For example, the court in Shapira 
admitted that there was “no census figures in evidence.”46  
However, it went on to speculate the sufficiency of the “number 
of eligible young ladies of Jewish parentage in this area from 
which [the plaintiff] would have a reasonable latitude of 
choice.”47 
The first empirical problem with the factual inquiry is that it 
is by no means clear that judges are equipped, or that they 
ought, to estimate the racial or cultural make-up of the 
beneficiary’s city.  Professor Sherman has argued that courts 
don’t even conduct this analysis “although it is easy enough to 
find courts willing at least to pay lip service to this distinction 
 
 43.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
10.1 (2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a 
donative document is the donor’s intention. The donor’s intention is given effect to 
the maximum extent allowed by law.” (emphasis added)). 
 44.  See supra text accompanying notes 37—40. 
 45.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. a (1983) 
(“A restraint unreasonably limits the transferee’s opportunity to marry if a marriage 
permitted by the restraint is not likely to occur.  The likelihood of marriage is a 
factual question, to be answered from the circumstances of the particular case.”) 
 46.  Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 831. 
 47.  Id. 
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between reasonable and unreasonable partial restraints.”48 
The bigger problem is that geographic census data is a 
sloppy proxy for the actual issue in question—the likelihood of 
marriage.  Merely because a city has a sizeable population of 
eligible spouses does not mean that this population contains 
members that would actually be willing to marry the 
beneficiary, even if the beneficiary is willing.  The population of 
eligible spouses is only one of many factors in determining the 
likelihood of marriage—other factors include social skills, level 
of education and income, age, and physical attractiveness.49  
There is also a persistent social myth that older women are more 
likely to be killed by a terrorist than to get married.50  If there is 
any truth to this myth at all, it follows that any marital restraint 
on a female beneficiary over 40-years old is “unreasonable”. 
If courts genuinely want to calculate the likelihood of a 
permissive marriage, they need to consider the above facts as 
well.  Otherwise, it is not clear why geographic population 
should be the chosen proxy for likelihood of marriage.  It would 
be inappropriate, and possibly offensive, for courts to make a 
genuine effort at figuring out the factual question of likelihood 
of marriage.  However, this does not mean that automatically 
presuming that geographic census data—or a speculative 




 48.  Sherman, supra note 38, at 1321. 
 49.  There is a wealth of literature in both scholarship and popular media 
speculating on the factors that make marriage more likely. See generally Lloyd 
Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; Or, “I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life”, 
16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987).  There are also prominent social theories about the 
affect of age on likelihood of marriage, especially for older women.  See, e.g., Tara 
Parker-Pope, Marriage and Women Over 40, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2010, 
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/26/marriage-and-women-over-40/. 
 50.  See, e.g., THE HOLIDAY (Columbia/Universal Pictures 2006) (“Single women 
over the age of 35 are more likely to be killed by a terrorist than get married.”); 
ADDICTED TO HIS LOVE  (Green/Epstein Productions 1988) (“A woman at 40 is more 
likely to get shot by a terrorist than get married.”); SLEEPLESS IN SEATTLE (TriStar 
Pictures 1993) (“It’s easier to be killed by a terrorist than it is to find a husband over 
the age of 40!”). 
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C.  FAILING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ACTUAL INFLUENCE ON 
BENEFICIARY 
The court in Shapira, in declining to invalidate the marital 
condition provision of the decedent’s will, held that the 
beneficiary “is no more being ‘blackmailed into a marriage by 
immediate financial gain,’ as suggested by counsel, than would 
be the beneficiary of a living gift or conveyance upon 
consideration of a future marriage—an arrangement which has 
long been sanctioned by the courts of this state.”51  Of course, the 
Court was correct in one aspect: there was no blackmail in this 
case. 
Blackmail, by definition, is the crime of threatening to 
reveal embarrassing, disgraceful, or damaging facts or rumors 
about a person unless paid off not to carry out the threat.52  In 
Shapira, the provision in the will was not threatening to take the 
plaintiff’s money if he did not comply with the restraint; rather, 
it was threatening to withhold a gratuitous gift.53  As the Court 
noted, it “is a fundamental rule of law in Ohio that a testator 
may legally entirely disinherit his children.”54 
In other words, the plaintiff had no entitlement, or right, to 
the decedent’s money in the first place, so the threat of 
withholding the gift is not blackmail.  Notably, however, this is 
true of any condition that withholds the gift, whether or not the 
condition is “reasonable”, there is a massive, willing, and eager 
population of permitted potential spouses in the plaintiff’s 
vicinity, and the plaintiff has a slim chance of marrying the 
decedent’s choice. 
 
 51.  Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 832. 
 52.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 192 (9th ed. 2009).  Perhaps the counsel quoted 
by the Shapira court chose to use the term “blackmail” rhetorically and did not 
intend for it to be taken as an actual legal argument.  However, the Court chose to 
quote it and explicitly rejected the notion as wrong.  
 53.  See Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 831 – 32. 
 54.  Id. at 828.  Ohio is not unique.  As a matter of fact, in “all states except 
Louisiana, a child or other descendant has no statutory protection against 
intentional disinheritance by a parent.  There is no requirement that a testator leave 
any property to a child, not even the proverbial one dollar.”  DUKEMINIER, ET AL., 
supra note 1, at 519. 
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Even if we do not go so far as to say that the provision is 
invalidated on grounds of blackmail—even if we merely 
disallow marital restraint provisions because public policy 
favors freedom of choice for marriage55—the question becomes 
whether the marital restraint actually restricts the beneficiary’s 
freedom of choice of marriage.  It, almost certainly, does not.56  
For example, if someone offers another fifty dollars to wear a red 
shirt, he is certainly not infringing on the other’s freedom to 
wear a shirt of any other color.  The provision in the will is 
similar—it is an inducement, not an order. 
D.  INCONSISTENT RESULTS 
As discussed in Section III.A.3, supra¸ “reasonableness” is 
applied as a factual test.  “[A] restraint unreasonably limits the 
transferee’s opportunity to marry if a marriage permitted by the 
restraint is not likely to occur.  The likelihood of marriage is a 
factual question, to be answered from the circumstances of the 
particular case.”57  This has been noted as an ostensibly arbitrary 
test that yields inconsistent and somewhat counter-intuitive 
results.  As Professor Sherman points out: 
[T]he approach seems unprincipled in that its results 
turn on the fortuities of geographic and demographic 
factors.  By this reasoning, a bequest conditioned on the 
legatee’s marrying a Jewish person stands more likely 
to be upheld in New York than in Wyoming, and a 
bequest conditioned on the legatee’s marrying a 
Christian probably could withstand attack everywhere 
in the country, while a bequest conditioned on the 
legatee’s marrying a Taoist probably could not survive 
anywhere.58 
In addition to the problems discussed by Professor 
Sherman, is the need to consider the future plans of the 
 
 55.  See, e.g., Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 829. 
 56.  There is perhaps one exception, if one subscribes to the notion of economic 
coercion.  See supra Section III.B. 
 57.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. a (1983). 
 58.  Sherman, supra note 38, at 1320—21. 
TABLES.FORMATTED.LEE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2013  11:35 AM 
70 MARQUETTE ELDER’S ADVISOR [Vol. 14 
beneficiary.  For example, if the testator conditioned his gift on 
the beneficiary marrying a Jewish person who lives in New 
York, but the beneficiary decided to move to Wyoming the 
Reasonableness Test would turn on these plans.  However, this 
severely destroys the consistency of the analyses across cases. 
IV.  ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO MARITAL RESTRAINTS 
Given the shortcomings of the Reasonableness Test, 59 the 
apparent task is to find a suitable replacement.  The general 
options are to (A) prohibit all marital restraints, (B) allow all 
marital restraints, (C) balance the public policy factors on a case-
by-case basis, or (D) prescribe a new test. 
A.  PROHIBITING ALL MARITAL RESTRAINTS (SHERMAN) 
Although, when it comes to testamentary writings, there is 
a general emphasis on the testator’s intent,60  Professor Sherman 
has argued that testation is only allowed to the extent “to avoid 
the harms that the abolition of testation would produce.  To 
avoid those harms it is crucial to allow property owners to 
designate their successors, but it is not necessary to allow them 
also to superintend their successors’ behavior.”61 
The following logic would  
invalidate all testamentary conditions calculated to 
restrain or induce particular personal conduct on the 
part of the legatees, even if the conduct in question has 
nothing to do with marriage or religion and even if the 
conduct sought to be induced is “good” or the conduct 
sought to be restrained is “bad”.62 
To Professor Sherman, “even if under a testamentary 
 
 59.  See supra Sections III.A.1—3 (discussing the shortcomings and problems of 
the reasonableness test). 
 60.  E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 10.1 (2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a 
donative document is the donor’s intention. The donor’s intention is given effect to 
the maximum extent allowed by law.” (emphasis added)). 
 61.  Sherman, supra note 38, at 1329.  
 62.  Id.  
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condition the class of permissible spouses includes all human 
beings except one, the condition should be held invalid.”63  As a 
result, he proposes a “blanket rule invalidating all testamentary 
restraints that condition bounty on the legatee’s ‘proper’ choice 
of spouse[.] . . . [This rule] is simpler and more predictable in its 
application, and more principled in its foundation.”64  Sherman’s 
proposition would invalidate not only marital restraint 
provisions, but also all testator attempts at behavior-shaping.65 
B.  ALLOWING ALL MARITAL RESTRAINTS (TESTATOR’S INTENT) 
Restatement (Third) of Property states that “[t]he 
controlling consideration in determining the meaning of a 
donative document is the donor’s intention.  The donor’s 
intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.”66  
Following this line of thought, Professor Kreiczer-Levy has 
noted that: 
[t]estamentary freedom is a pivotal value in the Anglo-
American legal tradition.  The property owner is 
conceived as holding the power to make free choices 
regarding the allocation of his property after death.  
 
 63.  Id. at 1322. 
 64.  Id. (emphasis added).  See also Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Religiously Inspired 
Gender-Bias Disinheritance—What’s Law Got To Do With It?, 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 
669, 689 (2010).  Although Kreiczer-Levy, unlike Sherman, does not argue for the 
flat-out prohibition on marital restraint provisions, she does note in her analysis 
that as a general matter, it is important to figure out  
whether disinheriting a woman because she is a woman, following a 
religious belief, indeed demeans her.  First of all, it is hardly controversial 
that women as a group have a history of mistreatment.  Now, the next step 
would be to assess the meaning of the act of disinheritance from the estate.  
This brings us back to our former discussion of inheritance as reaffirming a 
child's position in the family.  The law in British Columbia and New 
Zealand suggests that occasionally a decision to disinherit a child would 
be unacceptable.  There is a moral perception that is backed by social 
expectations that inheritance says something about the relationship 
between the child and the parent, that inheritance means something about 
a child's path in life, and that inheritance means something about the 
child's position in the family. 
Id. 
 65.  Sherman, supra note 38, at 1329. 
 66.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 
10.1 (2003) (emphasis added). 
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Inheritance law is thus usually conceived, almost 
intuitively, as part of the testator’s prerogative.  A 
massive part of the law naturally flows from this basic 
fact.  Reviewing the case law, testamentary freedom in 
one form or another, is frequently assumed.  In other 
words, the testator is at the focus of inheritance both in 
theory and in practice.  The freedom to choose one’s 
receivers is even more expansive and includes the 
testator’s ability to control his receivers’ lives through 
making conditions or by creating a trust.   
Testamentary freedom also points to an easy solution to 
our dilemma, an opposite one to forced heirship rules.  
The testator is free to disinherit his daughters on 
whatever grounds he sees fit.  He can disinherit her 
even out of pure spite or vindictive spirit.  Why then 
should the law interfere with a religiously inspired 
motive, even considering it is gender-bias?  The testator 
is not bound by the principle of equality.67 
The testator-intent-centered argument, of allowing all 
marital restraint provisions, is bolstered by the fact that “[i]n all 
states except Louisiana, a child or other descendant has no 
statutory protection against intentional disinheritance by a 
parent.  There is no requirement that a testator leave any 
property to a child, not even the proverbial one dollar.”68  Thus, 
there is a fairly strong argument that because decedents enjoy 
the right to withhold all gifts from potential beneficiaries, 
conditional gifts are but a subset of this general right. 
C.  CASE BY CASE BALANCING (FEINBERG II) 
In the recent Feinberg II case, the Supreme Court of Illinois 
 
 67.  Kreiczer-Levy, supra note 64, at 686. Notably, although Kreiczer-Levy 
summarizes the testator intent argument very well, she proposes a different 
approach.  Id. at 686—87  
(This is indeed a strong argument.  I suggest a different one. Inheritance 
law can, through the public policy doctrine, invalidate such a provision.  I 
do not argue the law should immediately endorse such a rule.  My goal 
here is much more modest.  I show that the question is intricate, and 
requires some deliberation.  I strive to show that even in a country that 
does not directly protect the family, it does not mean that any 
disinheritance is automatically morally accepted.). 
 68.  DUKEMINIER, ET AL., supra note 1, at 519. 
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was faced with a will provision that stated,69  
[a] descendant of mine other than a child of mine who 
marries outside the Jewish faith (unless the spouse of 
such descendant has converted or converts within one 
year of the marriage to the Jewish faith) and his or her 
descendants shall be deemed to be deceased for all 
purposes of this instrument as of the date of such 
marriage.70 
In Feinberg I, the Illinois Court of Appeals had voided the 
provision, ruling that “[t]he condition is an invalid restraint on 
marriage.”71  Although the Feinberg I majority did not apply the 
Reasonableness Test the concurring and dissenting opinions did, 
with differing results.  The Feinberg I concurrence held that the 
restraint was considered unreasonable in modern times.72  The 
Feinberg I dissenting opinion found that the restraint was 
reasonable.73  The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the 
invalidation of the provision, without articulating the 
Reasonableness Test; instead, it weighed the public policy 
concerns of freedom of testation against terms regarding 
marriage and divorce.74 
 
 69.  Technically, the provision was written as a condition for a conditional 
trust.  However, the actual marital restraint was adopted by the decedent’s wife’s 
will, which was at issue in the case.  Feinberg II, 919 N.E.2d 888, 902 (Ill. 2009)  
(The validity of a trust provision is not at issue, as the distribution 
provision of Max's trust was revoked when Erla exercised her power of 
appointment. Her distribution scheme was in the nature of a testamentary 
provision, which operated at the time of her death to determine who 
would be entitled to a $250,000 distribution.). 
 70.  Feinberg I, 891 N.E.2d 549, 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). 
 71.  Id. at 552. 
 72.  Id. at 555 (Quinn, J., concurring) (“While the Restatement (First) and 
(Second) of Trusts explained that restraints such as the instant ‘Jewish Clause’ were 
once considered reasonable, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts now provides that 
they are no longer reasonable.”). 
 73.  Id. at 558 (Greiman, J., dissenting )  
(Accordingly, the great weight of authority as to cases which have 
considered this subject have held such provisions as it appears in the case 
at bar to be reasonable and not contrary to the state's public policy. The 
majority places us in the minority of jurisdictions that have considered this 
issue.). 
 74.  Feinberg II, 919 N.E.2d at 894 (“When we determine that our answer to a 
question of law must be based on public policy, it is not our role to make such 
policy.  Rather, we must discern the public policy of the state of Illinois as 
expressed in the constitution, statutes, and long-standing case law.”). 
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The Feinberg II court ruled, on the one hand, that the public 
policy of the state of Illinois is “one of broad testamentary 
freedom, constrained only by the rights granted to a surviving 
spouse and the need to expressly disinherit a child born after 
execution of the will if that is the testator’s desire.”75  On the 
other hand, it stated that there is a “long-standing rule that 
conditions annexed to a gift that have the tendency to induce 
spouses to divorce . . . are void on grounds of public policy.”76 
Looking to the facts, the Feinberg II court found that the 
provision 
does not implicate the principle that trust provisions 
that encourage divorce violate public policy . . . 
[because it was not] “capable of exerting . . . a 
disruptive influence upon an otherwise normally 
harmonious marriage” by causing the beneficiary to 
choose between his or her spouse and the 
distribution . . . [because the provision] involves the 
decision to marry, not an incentive to divorce.77 
Furthermore, the Feinberg II court noted that it had 
“considered the validity of restrictions affecting marriage in 
cases going back as far as 1857.”78 
This is notably not an application of the classical 
Reasonableness Test—the Feinberg II court made no effort to 
answer the factual question of how many eligible spouses live in 
the city.79  Instead, the court balanced the policy factors—
 
 75.  Id. at 895. 
 76.  Id. at 897.  See also Orly Henry, If You Will It, It Is No Dream: Balancing Public 
Policy and Testamentary Freedom, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 215, 216 (2011)  
(Public policy in Illinois is to support, encourage, and safeguard the 
institution of marriage, and to promote marital harmony where possible.  
However, the state of Illinois also supports broad testamentary freedom, 
meaning that testators are generally given wide latitude to do as they 
please within the limits of the law and the state's public policy.  
(citing Feinberg II, 919 N.E.2d at 897 & 895, respectively)). 
 77.  Feinberg II, 919 N.E.2d at 899 (quoting In re Gerbing’s Estate, 377 N.E.2d 29, 
33 (Ill. 1975) (omission in original)). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Contra RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 6.2 cmt. a 
(1983) (“[A] restraint unreasonably limits the transferee’s opportunity to marry if a 
marriage permitted by the restraint is not likely to occur.  The likelihood of 
marriage is a factual question, to be answered from the circumstances of the 
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testamentary freedom and discouragement of marriage.80 
D.  ALTERNATIVE TESTS 
As an alternative to (A) prohibiting all marital restraints, (B) 
allowing all marital restraints, and (C) ad hoc case-by-case 
balancing, this article suggest a new test.  The new test should 
offer advantages beyond those of the other alternative methods, 
as well as address the problems inherent in the Reasonableness 
Test.  This article intends to do just that in its offer of the 
Coercion Test.  The next section will discuss the new test, and 
the advantages of the new test over the first three options. 
V.  THE COERCION TEST AND ITS ADVANTAGES 
If the freedom of choice of marriage is a great enough public 
policy reason to curtail the testator’s intent, which it appears to 
be,81 then the testator’s intent should be circumvented only when 
that freedom is threatened.  The Reasonableness Test fails to 
address this—it is both over and under inclusive.  The reader 
should consider a new test that measures the actual influence that 
the provision has on the beneficiary.  This new test will be called 
the Coercion Test, which invalidates a will provision only when 
the court finds that it is coercive. 
A.  THE TEST FOR COERCION 
In a testamentary restraint on marriage the testator 
 
particular case.”) 
 80.  Feinberg II, 919 N.E.2d at 894. 
 81.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE 
TRANSFERS § 10.1 (2003) (“The controlling consideration in determining the 
meaning of a donative document is the donor’s intention. The donor’s intention is 
given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.” (emphasis added)).  See also Henry, 
supra note 76, at 216  
(Beneficiary restriction clauses and other similar testamentary provisions 
can present an issue of public policy because these clauses may be 
disruptive to marital harmony, whether or not the testator intended such 
an effect. These clauses can be construed as coercive, forcing potential 
beneficiaries to choose between an inheritance and a love that does not 
meet the conditions of the clause.). 
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threatens to withhold a gratuitous gift, not harm the beneficiary.  
Can this ever amount to coercion?  Perhaps the closest analogy 
can be found in the academic literature concerning coercive 
wage offers.  Since the controversy is longstanding in 
contemporary western economies, a thorough discussion is 
beyond the scope of this article.  However, the general question 
is whether, “the wage bargain in a capitalist labor market [is] 
coercive if the worker is limited to a choice between unpalatable 
alternatives, for example, working at a low-paying job and 
starving?”82 
This question is analogous to the issue in this article, 
because the analysis is the same, replacing the “low-paying job” 
with an “undesirable marriage.”  In both cases, the party 
holding the money has no obligation to pay the beneficiary, but 
chooses to condition the payment on the beneficiary doing 
something he would rather not.  Some argue that when the 
beneficiary is in a time of true economic distress, coercion 
exists.83  Others entertain a narrower conception of coercion.84  
For example if, 
Z is faced with working or starving; the choices and 
actions of all other persons do not add up to providing 
Z with some other option. . . . Does Z choose to work 
voluntarily?  (Does someone on a desert island who 
must work to survive?)  Z does choose voluntarily if 
the other individuals A through Y each acted 
voluntarily and within their rights. . . . A person’s 
choice among differing degrees of unpalatable 
alternatives is not rendered nonvoluntary by the fact 
that others voluntarily chose and acted within their 
rights in a way that did not provide him with a more 
palatable alternative.85 
 
 82.  David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 121, 121 
(1981). 
 83.  See, e.g., C. B. MACPHERSON, Elegant Tombstones: A Note on Friedman’s 
Freedom, in DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 143, 146 (1973) (noting that 
“the existence of a labour force without its own sufficient capital [is] . . . therefore 
without a choice as to whether to put its labour in the market or not.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 84.  See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 263—64 (1974). 
 85.  Id. (emphasis added). Nozick also gives the following example: “Suppose 
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Others have argued that this emphasis on prior rights and 
wrongs is misplaced, that instead, “wage proposals generally do 
count as genuine offers, because workers generally do want to 
make the move from actual pre-proposal situations . . . to the 
proposal situations capitalists make available.”86  Therefore, an 
offer is “coercive if and only if (1) an alternative pre-proposal 
situation workers would strongly prefer to the actual one is 
technologically and economically feasible when the offer is 
made, and (2) capitalists prevent workers from having at least 
one of these feasible alternative pre-proposal situations.”87  An 
example of this is if a beneficiary is kidnapped, brought to an 
island where there is only one factory, and he has to work there 
in order not to starve.  This is a case where the beneficiary is 
actively prevented “from being in the alternative pre-proposal 
situation [he] strongly prefers.”88  Yet, another view is that an 
offer of money is coercive if the beneficiary’s “dependency and 
need”89 is exploited.90 
This has only been a brief glimpse at the arguments about 
wage coercion, but it gives us some elementary tools with which 
to approach the marital restraint problem.  Conditional offers of 
money are only coercive in very specific, and limited situations 
where “not helping is just as bad as harming.”91  Most of the 
literature agrees that coercion requires—at the minimum—that 
the coerced party is in a situation of economic distress, which is 
 
there are twenty-six women and twenty-six men each wanting to be married. For 
each sex, all of that sex agree on the same ranking of the twenty-six members of the 
opposite sex in terms of desirability as marriage partners.”  Id. at 263.  The most 
desirable woman will marry the most desirable man.  Id.  When the second most 
desirable man marries the second most desirable woman, “their choices are not 
made nonvoluntary merely by the fact that there is something else they each would 
rather do.  This other most preferred option requires the cooperation of others who 
have chosen, as is their right, not to cooperate.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
 86.  Zimmerman, supra note 82, at 144. 
 87.  Id. at 144—45. 
 88.  Id. at 133 (emphasis removed). 
 89.  HARRY G. FRANKFURT, THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT: 
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 33 (1988). 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Zimmerman, supra note 82, at 135. 
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exploited.92  Others require substantively more than exploitation 
in that “the person who does the coercing [must] undermine[], or 
limit[] the freedom of the person who is coerced.”93 
A different approach—one that does not focus on economic 
need—is given by a very recent empirical study, which found 
that 82% of respondents felt that an offer of payment is coercive 
if the offer of payment causes them to feel that they have no 
reasonable alternative but to participate.94  This modern account 
is not an entire departure from the academic theories; if the 
induced party feels enough economic need, it follows that he 
will consider there to be no reasonable alternatives. 
At the very least, though, the consensus is that if a will 
provision is coercive, it must require the coerced party be in a 
situation economically desperate enough to choose the 
unpalatable choice, or otherwise have no alternative.  Any less, 
and there is no coercion, and no limitation on the beneficiary’s 
freedom. 
B.  ADVANTAGES OF THE COERCION TEST OVER ALTERNATIVE 
APPROACHES 
1.  PROHIBITING ALL MARITAL RESTRAINTS VERSUS THE 
COERCION TEST 
The argument for prohibiting all marital restraints assumes 
that testation is only allowed “to the extent necessary to avoid 
the harms that the abolition of testation would produce.”95  
However, this approach seems somewhat at odds with the 
testator’s ability to completely disinherit.96  A blanket 
 
 92.  See, e.g., Macpherson, supra note 83, at 146; FRANKFURT, supra note 89, at 33. 
 93.  Zimmerman, supra note 82, at 134. 
 94.  Emily A. Largent, et al., Money, Coercion, and Undue Inducement: Attitudes 
about Payments to Research Participants, IRB: ETHICS & HUM. RES., Jan.—Feb. 2012, at 
Table 3. 
 95.  Sherman, supra note 38, at 1329.  
 96.  DUKEMINIER, ET AL., supra note 1, at 519 (As a matter of fact, “[i]n all states 
except Louisiana, a child or other descendant has no statutory protection against 
intentional disinheritance by a parent. There is no requirement that a testator leave 
any property to a child, not even the proverbial one dollar.”). 
TABLES.FORMATTED.LEE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/18/2013  11:35 AM 
2012] RESTRAINTS ON MARRIAGE 79 
prohibition on all marital restraints would put testators (who 
know the law) in the position of deciding whether it would be 
better to completely disinherit his child, out of anticipation that 
the child will not marry someone suitable, or give an 
unconditional gift.  This seems like an extremely uncomfortable 
position. 
Sherman’s main concern, in promulgating the blanket 
prohibition approach, is opposition to excessive dead-hand 
control.  According to Sherman, “it is not necessary to allow 
[testators] . . . to superintend their successors’ behavior.”97  
Sherman also notes that “it’s nearly time we had a little less 
respect for the dead, an’ a little more regard for the livin’.”98  The 
beauty of the Coercion Test is that it should not arouse Professor 
Sherman’s concerns about dead-hand control, because the crux 
of the Coercion Test is ensuring that the living beneficiaries are 
not coerced into changing their behavior.99  If a provision is 
found to be coercive, it would be invalidated under the Coercion 
Test.  Thus, the Coercion Test will result in similar “regard” for 
the living, as a blanket prohibition on all marital restraints, but 
also pay more homage to testator intent. 
2.  ALLOWING ALL MARITAL RESTRAINTS VERSUS THE COERCION 
TEST 
There are two obvious problems with allowing all marital 
restraints to be enforced.  First, it allows the dead-hand an 
inordinate amount of power.  Allowing all marital restraints is 
an unpopular argument because it always places testator intent 
over the priorities of the living.100  Second, it disregards any 
public policy concerns.  Courts have long held that provisions 
contrary to public policy should be voided.101 
 
 97.  Sherman, supra note 38, at 1329. 
 98.  Id. at 1330 (quoting SEAN O’CASEY, Juno and the Paycock, in THREE PLAYS 49 
(1968)). 
 99.  See supra Section V.A. 
 100.  See, e.g., Sherman, supra note 38, at 1329. 
 101.  Almost all marital restraint cases consider public policy as a value that is 
important enough to offset testator intent. See, e.g., Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 
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First, the Coercion Test properly limits the dead-hand in 
situations where it tries to coerce the living.  In situations where 
the living is not coerced by the provision, the dead-hand has no 
power.  There is no need to fear the dead-hand in situations 
where it has no power over the living. 
Second, the Coercion Test is built on the crux of the public 
policy concern for freedom of choice of marriage.  This means 
that, unlike a blanket allowance on all marital restraints, it will 
take the public policy concern of freedom of choice of marriage 
into account and void provisions that harm this interest. 
3.  CASE-BY-CASE BALANCING VERSUS THE COERCION TEST 
This case-by-case balancing approach offers some of the 
benefits that the Reasonableness Test does not offer.  Most 
notably, it does not yield the absurdities or legal inconsistencies 
discussed in Sections III.A.1—3, supra.  However, some have 
argued that the Illinois Supreme Court’s case-by-case balancing 
approach in “Feinberg does not provide clear guidance because 
the court carefully narrowed the issue to the facts before it,”102 
and that it should “have established a more clear precedent 
rather than potentially limiting the precedent established in 
Feinberg to the case’s particular facts.”103  This is, essentially, a 
complaint about the case-by-case approach.  When the court 
endeavors to balance the public policies invoked by the facts of a 
case, of course their holding will be limited to the case’s 
particular facts—this is inevitable. 
The Coercion Test would be a less ad-hoc method of 
approaching marital restraint provisions than case-by-case 
 
N.E.2d 825, 829 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974) (“A partial restraint of marriage which 
imposes only reasonable restrictions is valid, and not contrary to public policy”); In 
re Harris’ Will, 143 N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1955); 6 WILLIAM J. BOWE & 
DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 44.25 (Rev. Ed. 2005); 52 AM. 
JUR. 2D Marriage § 117 (2011); United States Nat’l Bank v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 
866 (Or. 1954); In re Silverstein’s Will, 155 N.Y.S.2d 598, 599 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1956); 
Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 99 A. 672, 675 (Md. 1916). 
 102.  See Henry, supra note 76, at 236. 
 103.  Id. at 233. 
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balancing.  Courts could develop clear factors used to consider 
whether the provision is coercive, and they could benefit from 
the established literature on economic coercion.104  Therefore, the 
Coercion Test would offer the sensitivity to public policy and 
testator intent that case-by-case balancing would offer, while 
ensuring smoother and more consistent application in courts. 
4.  REASONABLENESS TEST VERSUS THE COERCION TEST 
The Coercion Test avoids many of the pitfalls of the 
Reasonableness Test described in Section III.105  First, the 
Reasonableness Test perpetuates judgment of testator’s 
judgment along with claims that the judgment is based on 
“reasonableness”, not the testator’s judgment.  But, as discussed 
in Section III.A, supra, this is fundamentally duplicitous because 
any judgment that the testator’s chosen condition is 
“unreasonable” is essentially a conclusion of the testator’s 
judgment on what the suitable condition on the gift is.  The 
Coercion Test circumvents this problem because it shifts the 
focus from the “reasonableness” of the donor’s condition, to the 
control the provision has over the donor.  Under the Coercion 
Test, it does not matter what the donor wants—so the donor’s 
intention is not judged—rather, what matters is how desperate 
or exploited the donee is by the condition. 
Second, it would be empirically easier for courts to 
determine factors of the Coercion Test than those of the 
Reasonableness Test.106  Instead of acting as a census taker and 
speculating as to how likely the beneficiary is to attract an 
eligible spouse given the local population of women or men, the 
court applying the Coercion Test can examine factors like, the 
amount of money offered by the will, the economic condition of 
the beneficiary, and the alternative options open to the donee.  
Much of this evidence will be readily available to the court. 
 
 104.  See supra Section V.A. 
 105.  See supra Section III. 
 106.  See supra Section III.B (discussing empirical problems with the 
reasonableness test). 
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The Coercion Test will also provide more consistent results.  
Professor Sherman’s concern that the Reasonableness Test’s 
“results turn on the fortuities of geographic and demographic 
factors”107 will be sufficiently addressed by the Coercion Test.  
This is because, in the Coercion Test, the results no longer turn 
on the geographic population in the state in which the 
beneficiary lives; instead, they turn on the actual pressure the 
provision places on the beneficiary. 
Lastly, the Coercion Test will attack the crux of the public 
policy problem – that the dead shall wrongly restrict the 
freedom of choice of marriage of the living.  As discussed in 
Section III, the Reasonableness Test is both over and under 
inclusive in addressing this problem. 
 




1 Background: Son has fallen 
on hard times and is in 
desperate need of cash for 
food and clothes. 
Will Provision: I hereby give 
Son my fortune of one million 
dollars, but only if he marries 






2 Background: Son makes 
enough money to support 
himself, although — like 
everyone else — would 
welcome extra money. 
Will Provision: I hereby give 
Son my fortune of one million 
dollars, but only if he marries 






 107.  Sherman, supra note 38, at 1320—21.  See also supra Section III.B. 
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3 Background: Son has fallen 
on hard times and is in 
desperate need of cash for 
food and clothes. 
Will Provision: I hereby give 
Son my fortune of one million 
dollars, but only if he marries 






4 Background: Son makes 
enough money to support 
himself, although — like 
everyone else — would 
welcome extra money. 
Will Provision: I hereby give 
Son my fortune of one million 
dollars, but only if he marries 






Table 1. Comparing the Reasonableness with Coercion in 
Testamentary Restraints on Marriage. 
 
The Coercion Test addresses public policy concerns better 
than the Reasonableness Test.  Consider Table 1.  Table 1 poses 
four hypothetical cases, and also whether courts would uphold 
the provisions applying tests of reasonableness, as contrasted 
with tests of coercion.  In Scenarios 2 and 3, the two tests yield 
the same result.  In Scenarios 1 and 4, the tests yield differing 
results.  In Scenario 1, Son desperately needs money.  Assume 
that his situation is bad enough for economic coercion to be a 
 
 108.  Baloch is a small ethnic group that makes up 2% of the population of 
Afghanistan, 2% of the population of Iran, and 3.57% the population of Pakistan.  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (Jan. 25, 2012), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publicatons/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html.  Let 
us assume that the beneficiary is living in the United States and has a very small 
chance of successfully locating such a woman. 
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true threat.  Now, no matter how reasonable the provision is—
that is, no longer how likely it is that he will be able to find a 
permitted spouse—he will, more or less, be forced to seek out 
and marry her if he actually needs the money.  In Scenario 4, Son 
does not need money so badly that the offer of money would be 
considered economic coercion.  He is free to decide whether or 
not to accept the conditional gift. 
If the public policy concern is protecting the freedom of 
choice of marriage, it must be that the provision in Scenario 1 is 
more harmful than the provision in Scenario 4.  Although the 
Scenario 4 condition is unreasonable, it in no way infringes upon 
Son’s freedom.  It might frustrate him to know that he is 
foregoing a large fortune because he cannot find a permitted 
mate; but, he is no more bound to the marital restraint than any 
student who is offered money to do a research project. 
In contrast, if Son in Scenario 1 feels that he needs the 
money in order to afford the bare requirements of survival, he is 
bound to the marital restraint no matter how easy or difficult it 
is to carry out.  His freedom of choice of marriage is curtailed, no 
matter what the condition is.  If the balance to be made here is 
between the testator’s intent (which is traditionally favored in 
the making of wills) and public policy (which centers on 
encouraging marriage and freedom of choice thereof), a test of 
whether the beneficiary was actually coerced by the will 
provision is the better test for courts. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This article began by examining how courts have approached 
marital restraint provisions in wills by using the Reasonableness 
Test, but finding that it has several fatal shortcomings. 
Next, the article discussed possible alternative approaches 
to testamentary marital restraints.  The four most prominent 
approaches were: (1) a blanket prohibition of all marital 
restraints, most noticeably promulgated by Professor Jeffrey G. 
Sherman; (2) a blanket allowance of all marital restraints 
centered on the value of honoring testator intent; (3) a case-by-
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case balancing approach used by the Feinberg II court in a recent 
case; and (4) the possibility of pursuing a new test that does not 
suffer from the same shortcomings as the Reasonableness Test.  
Table 2 is included for convenience, summarizing the different 
approaches to testamentary restraints on marriage. 
 
Approach Internal Reference 
Reasonableness Test Section II.A–B (Summary),  Section 
III (Problems), Section V.B.4 (as 
compared to the Coercion Test) 
Prohibition of All Marital Restraints Section IV.A (Summary), Section 
V.B.1 (as compared to the Coercion 
Test) 
Allowance of All Marital Restraints Section IV.B (Summary), Section 
V.B.2 (as compared to the Coercion 
Test) 
Case-By-Case Balancing Section IV.C (Summary), Section 
V.B.3 (as compared to the Coercion 
Test) 
Coercion Test Section V.A (Summary), Section V.B 
(as compared to other approaches) 




The new test that this article has proposed—the Coercion 
Test—is a sensible approach to testamentary restraints on 
marriage.  It avoids all four of the major problems with the 
Reasonableness Test, it provides more respect for testator’s 
intent than a blanket prohibition, it is more protective of public 
policy than a blanket allowance, and it provides more consistent 
results than a case-by-case balancing approach.  Most 
importantly, the Coercion Test addresses the crux of the public 
policy problem: whether an individual is being forced into, or out 
of, marriage. 
 
